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APPROPRIATE SCOPE OF AN ENVIRONMENTAL
IMPACT STATEMENT: THE INTERRELA-
TIONSHIP OF IMPACTS
Since the National Environmental Policy Act of 1969 (NEPA) I be-
came law, the environmental impact statement has emerged as an exact-
ing yardstick of agency compliance with the Act, and an effective
weapon to force the occasionally reluctant administrator into heightened
awareness of his responsibilities under NEPA. Section 102 (2)(C) of
NEPA calls for preparation of an environmental impact statement to
accompany all "proposals for legislation and other major Federal actions
significantly affecting the quality of the human environment,"2 and the
federal courts, lest the environmental concerns "heralded in the halls of
Congress, [be] lost or misdirected in the vast hallways of the federal
bureaucracy,"3 have held consistently that NEPA creates duties enforce-
able in an action challenging the adequacy of such an impact statement.4
The predictable result5 has been a plethora of cases seeking judicial
determinations that the impact statements prepared by agencies failed to
comply with the requirements of NEPA,s or challenging the failure to
THE FOLLOWING CITATION WILL BE USED IN THIS NOTE:
Hearings on National Environmental Policy Act Oversight Before the Subcomm.
on Fisheries and Wildlife Conservation and the Environment of the House Comm. on
Merchant Marine and Fisheries, 94th Cong., 1st Sess., ser. 94-14, at 8 (1975) [hereinaf-
ter cited as Hearings on NEPA Oversight].
1. 42 U.S.C. §§ 4331 et seq. (1970).
2. 42 U.S.C. § 4332(2)(C) (1970).
3. Calvert Cliffs Coordinating Comm., Inc. v. AEC, 449 F.2d 1109, 1111 (D.C.
Cir. 1971).
4. See, e.g., Environmental Defense Fund, Inc. v. Corps of Engineers, 492 F.2d
1123 (5th Cir. 1974); Environmental Defense Fund, Inc. v. Corps of Engineers, 470
F.2d 289 (8th Cir.), cert. denied, 412 U.S. 931 (1972); Scenic Hudson Preservation
Conference v. FPC, 453 F.2d 463 (2d Cir. 1971), cert. denied, 407 U.S. 926 (1972);
Calvert Cliffs Coordinating Comm., Inc. v. AEC, 449 F.2d 1109 (D.C. Cir. 1971).
5. Cf. Calvert Cliffs Coordinating Comm., Inc. v. AEC, 449 F.2d 1109, 1111
(D.C. Cir. 1971) ("These cases are only the beginning of what promises to become a
flood of new litigation"). See also Lynch, Complying with NEPA: The Tortuous Path
to an Adequate Environmental Impact Statement, 14 ARIz. L. REv. 717, 718 (1972)
("The geneses of such litigation are readily identifiable-a law couched in generalities,
implemented by equally indefinite 'Guidelines,' intermingled in an atmosphere of judicial
activism, agency foot-dragging and litigant zealousness").
6. E.g., Greene County Planning Bd. v. FPC, 455 F.2d 412 (2d Cir.), cert. denied,
409 U.S. 819 (1972); Committee for Nuclear Responsiblity v. Seaborg, 463 F.2d 783
(D.C. Cir.), injunction denied sub nom. Committee for Nuclear Responsibility v.
Schlesinger, 404 U.S. 917 (1971).
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prepare an impact statement.7 Increasingly common is the claim that
the scope of an impact statement is inappropriate-that the federal ac-
tion under consideration has been artificially truncated into segments
which cannot be meaningfully evaluated in isolation from one another.
To identify the appropriate unit for evaluation, the courts have
utilized a variety of criteria, drawn for the most part from the paradigm
situation of improper segmentation, the highway cases.' This Note will
analyze and criticize the most commonly used criteria-independent
utility of a segment, irretrievable commitment of resources, foreclosure
of alternatives, and the existence of a program plan. A new analysis
suggested by several recent cases,9 the interrelatedness of impacts analy-
sis, will be discussed and expanded into a comprehensive and more
workable approach to the problem of identifying the appropriate scope
of an impact statement.
THE ENVIRONMENTAL IMPACT STATEMENT AND THE
SCOPE OF A "MAJOR FEDERAL ACTION"
The impact statement is crucially important because it is the sole
action-forcing provision of NEPA: through the medium of the impact
statement, decisions affecting the environment are subjected to public
scrutiny"' and to judicial review."t It is the product of distrust of the
administrative process, and manifests the suspicion that without some
check on regulatory decisionmaking environmental concerns would re-
ceive short shrift. 2 The mandate to prepare an impact statement is
7. E.g., Hanly v. Mitchell, 460 F.2d 640 (2d Cir.), cert. denied, 409 U.S. 990
(1972).
8. See, e.g., Movement Against Destruction v. Volpe, 361 F. Supp. 1360 (D.Md.
1973), affd per curiam, 500 F.2d 29 (1974); James River and Kanawha Canal Parks,
Inc. v. Richmond Metropolitan Authority, 359 F. Supp. 611 (E.D. Va. 1973); Citizens
for Mass Transit Against Freeways v. Brinegar, 357 F. Supp. 1269 (D. Ariz. 1973);
Daly v. Volpe, 350 F. Supp. 252 (W.D. Wash. 1972), injunction dissolved, 376 F. Supp.
987 (1974), afj'd, 514 F.2d 1106 (9th Cir. 1975); Thompson v. Fugate, 347 F. Supp.
120 (E.D. Va. 1972).
9. Ecology Center of La., Inc. v. Coleman, 515 F.2d 860 (5th Cir. 1975) (see
notes 132-34 infra and accompanying text); Appalachian Mountain Club v. Brinegar,
394 F. Supp. 105 (D.N.H. 1975) (see notes 123-26 infra and accompanying text).
10. The following statement was made by Sen. Henry Jackson (D. Wash.), sponsor
of NEPA:
The basic principle of the policy is that we must strive in all that we do,
to achieve a standard of excellence in man's relationships to his physical sur-
roundings. If there are to be departures from this standard of excellence they
should be exceptions to the rule and the policy. And as exceptions, they will
have to be justified in the light of public scrutiny as required by section 102.
115 CONG. REC. 40,416 (1969).
i I. See cases cited in note 4 supra.
12. Note, A Panoramic View of the National Environmental Policy Act, 16
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conditioned, however, upon the existence and dimensions of a "major
federal action,"': and the panorama of federal activity is so vast that
isolating an individual "action" for environmental evaluation is often
difficult. The problem is compounded by the fact that some federal
programs span a period of years, and may have been commenced before
NEPA became effective." The responsible federal official is faced with
determining whether to prepare one impact statement to evaluate a
broad multi-year program,' 5 a series of statements to evaluate individual
components of the program (and how many components such a broad
program should be divided into), or the broader program statement as
well as the component statements.'
There are pitfalls whatever decision is made. If an impact state-
ment is prepared for the broad program only, it may give insufficient
treatment to the impact of a component project,' 7 or may provide
HowARD L.J. 116, 123 n.16 (1970). See generally Conservation Soe'y of S. Vt., Inc. v.
Secretary of Transp., 362 F. Supp. 627, 637 (D. Vt. 1973), afl'd, 508 F.2d 927 (2d Cir.
1974), vacated sub nor. Coleman v. Conservation Soc'y of S. Vt., Inc., 96 S. Ct. 19
(1975), rev'd, 531 F.2d 637 (2d Cir. 1976) (alluding to the possible inconsistency of
the existence of highway trust funds with NEPA); LIBRARY OF CONGRESS, A NATIONAL
POLICY FOR THE ENVIRONMENT, SELECTED EXCERPTS FROM THE CONGRESSIONAL RECORD
AND CONGRESSIONAL DOCUMENTS 32 (1969) (comment of Sen. Muskie): "The concept
of self policing by Federal Agencies which pollute or license pollution is contrary to the
philosophy and intent of existing environmental quality legislation .
13. 42 U.S.C. § 4332(2) (C) (1970).
14. The average time from concept to conclusion of a Corps of Engineers project is
15-16 years. Hearings on NEPA Oversight 8. The highway challenged in Named
Individual Members of the San Antonio Conservation Soc'y v. Texas Highway Dep't, 446
F.2d 1013 (5th Cir.), cert. denied, 403 U.S. 932 (1971), was originally proposed in
1955. The route was chosen in 1960, and suit was brought in 1967. Id. at 1014-16. The
Strawberry Aqueduct system, the impact statement for which was challenged in Sierra
Club v. Stamm, 507 F.2d 788 (10th Cir. 1974), is part of a water collection system
which will probably not be completed until sometime in the next century. Id. at 789.
The breeder reactor program, subject of Scientists' Institute for Public Information, Inc.
v. AEC, 481 F.2d 1079 (D.C. Cir. 1973), will not result in a commercially competitive
reactor until 2010. 5 BNA ENVIRONMENTAL REP. CURRENT DEVELOPMENTS 1801 (Mar.
14, 1975). Perhaps the project of greatest antiquity was the Tennessee-Tombigbee
Waterway, considered in Environmental Defense Fund, Inc. v. Corps of Engineers, 492
F.2d 1123 (5th Cir. 1974), which was originally studied in 1874-75. Id. at 1127.
15. Throughout this Note, the term "program" will signify a set of individual actions
related by a single purpose or design, while the term "project" will refer to a narrow
segment or component of a broader program.
16. In fact, it may be questionable whether any federal program exists at all. See,
e.g., Sierra Club v. Morton, 514 F.2d 856 (D.C. Cir. 1975), cert. granted sub nom.
Kleppe v. Sierra Club, 96 S. Ct. 772 (1976).
17. A program statement on the use of herbicides in the national forests was found
inadequate by two courts for failure to include discussion of specific sites and individual
geographic conditions. Kelley v. Butz, 8 E.R.C. 1449 (W.D. Mich. 1975); Wisconsin v.
Butz, 7 E.R.C. 1651 (E.D. Wis. 1975). See also Natural Resources Defense Council,
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inadequate notice to persons affected by individual projects, thus fore-
closing the possibility of obtaining their comments and suggestions on
the program.'" If the decision is made to segment the program and
evaluate each project individually, a project impact statement may over-
look effects of the project beyond its immediate vicinity; 9 there may be
a failure to consider the cumulative effects of a series of individual
projects; 20 or completion of one or more projects may force completion
of the final project which may itself have a detrimental impact.21 Also
involved in the decision is the desire to avoid the considerable expense of
preparing unnecessary impact statements 22 and the countervailing fear
of expensive delays incident to litigation over the scope of the statement
prepared.23
Final review of every impact statement prepared by a federal
official and promulgation of guidelines for statement preparation are the
Inc. v. Morton, 388 F. Supp. 829 (D.D.C. 1974); Natural Resources Defense Council,
Inc. v. TVA, 367 F. Supp. 122 (E.D. Tenn. 1973), afj'd, 502 F.2d 852 (6th Cir. 1974).
18. See, e.g., letter from Hamilton Hess, Northern California Regional Conservation
Comm., Sierra Club, to Dep't of the Interior, Nov. 10, 1971, in DEP'T OF THE INTERIOR,
FINAL ENVIRONMENTAL STATEMENT FOR THE GEOTHERMAL LEASING PROGRAM ch. I, at
436 (1973).
19. See, e.g., Atchison T. & S.F. Ry. v. Callaway, 382 F. Supp. 610 (D.D.C. 1974);
Committee to Stop Route 7 v. Volpe, 346 F. Supp. 731 (D. Conn. 1972), extension of
injunction denied sub nom. Citizens for Balanced Environment and Transp. v. Volpe,
376 F. Supp. 806 (D. Conn.), aft'd, 503 F.2d 601 (2d Cir. 1974), cert. denied, 96
S. Ct. 135 (1975).
20. See, e.g., Sierra Club v. Morton, 514 F.2d 856 (D.C. Cir. 1975), cert. granted
sub nom. Kleppe v. Sierra Club, 96 S. Ct. 772 (1976); Conservation Soc'y of S. Vt., Inc.
v. Secretary of Transp., 508 F.2d 927 (2d Cir. 1974), vacated sub non?. Coleman v.
Conservation Soc'y of S. Vt., Inc., 96 S. Ct. 19 (1975), rev'd, 531 F.2d 637 (2d Cir.
1976).
21. See, e.g., Named Individual Members of the San Antonio Conservation Soc'y v.
Texas Highway Dep't, 446 F.2d 1013 (5th Cir.), cert. denied, 403 U.S. 932 (1971);
Appalachian Mountain Club v. Brinegar, 394 F. Supp. 105 (D.N.H. 1975).
22. Impact statements can run to incredible lengths, such as the 2,485 page docu-
ment challenged in Inman Park Restoration, Inc. v. Urban Mass Transp. Administra-
tion, Civil No. 75-717A (N.D. Ga. Nov. 7, 1975), or the 4,300 page statement prepared
for the liquid metal breeder reactor program. 5 BNA ENVIRONMENTAL REP. CURRENT
DEVELOPMENTS 1617 (Feb. 14, 1975). The cost of preparing an EIS can be equally
astronomical. According to Angelo Giambusso, a member of the Nuclear Regulatory
Commission, the average cost of an impact statement covering a license for a nuclear
reactor is $1.7 million. 6 BNA ENVIRONMENTAL REP. CURRENT DEVELOPMENTS 205,
206 (May 23, 1975). The Corps of Engineers has added 215 full-time employees and
300 part-time employees to handle impact statement preparation and review, Hearings
on NEPA Oversight 22, and in fiscal year 1974 devoted $22 million to the process.
SixTH ANNUAL REPORT OF THE COUNCIL ON ENVIRONMENTAL QUALITY 636 (1975).
23. In some cases the cost of environmental study or litigation is considerable: "[I]t
is estimated that the cost of replacing the lost capacity of the Palisades plant in Michigan
is $1 million per month, while that of New York's Indian Point 2 plant is put at
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responsibility of the Council on Environmental Quality (CEQ) .24 Since
its publication of early directives on impact statement preparation, the
CEQ has "strongly encouraged"25 the use of broad program statements,
and the current Guidelines call for evaluation of a broad program
whenever possible:
In many cases, broad program statements will be required in order to
assess the environmental effects of a number of individual actions on
a given geographical area (e.g., coal leases), or environmental impacts
that are generic or common to a series of agency actions (e.g., main-
tenance or waste handling practices), or the overall impact of a large
scale program or chain of contemplated projects (e.g., major lengths of
highway as opposed to small segments). Subsequent statements on
major individual actions will be necessary where such actions have
significant environmental impacts not adequately evaluated in the pro-
gram statement .26
CEQ officials perceive a need for more program statements27 and are
currently developing guidelines to assist agencies in defining the appro-
priate scope of the impact statements prepared. 28 Numerous commenta-
tors have echoed the CEQ position,29 calling for program statements in
$3 million per month." Murphy, The National Environmental Policy Act and the
Licensing Process: Environmentalist Magna Carta or Agency Coup de Grace?, 72
COLUM. L. REv. 963, 969 (1972). The cost of delay in construction of the Storm King
project at Cornwall, N.Y., challenged in Scenic Hudson Preservation Conference v. FPC,
453 F.2d 463 (2d Cir. 1971), cert. denied, 407 U.S. 926 (1972), according to the
Chairman of the Board of the Consolidated Edison Co., was the New York power
shortage of 1969. Luce, Power for Tomorrow: The Siting Dilemma, 1 ENV. LAv 60
(1970).
24. 42 U.S.C. §§ 4332(2) (C), 4344(3) (1970); Exec. Order No. 11,514, 3 C.F.R.
271 (1974).
25. SIXTR ANNUAL REPORT OF THE COUNCIL ON ENVIRONMENTAL QUALITY 640-41
(1975); FiFm ANNUAL REPORT OF THE COUNCIL ON ENVIRONMENTAL QuALITY 392-93
(1974); THIRD ANNUAL REPORT OF THE COUNCIL ON ENVIRONMENTAL QUALITY 233
(1972); Council on Environmental Quality, Memorandum to Federal Agencies on
Procedures for Improving Environmental Impact Statements, 3 BNA ENVIRONMENTAL
REP. CURRENT DEVELOPMENTS 82, 87 (May 19, 1972).
26. 40 C.F.R. § 1500.6(d)(1) (1974).
27. FIFrH ANNUAL REPORT OF THE COUNCIL ON ENVIRONMENTAL QUALITY 392-93
(1974); statement of Malcolm F. Baldwin, Senior Staff Member, CEQ, in 6 BNA
ENVIRONMENTAL REP. CURRENT DEVELOPMENTs 205 (May 23, 1975).
28. Hearings on NEPA Oversight 206 (statement of Russell W. Peterson, Chairman,
Council on Environmental Quality).
29. See, e.g., Coggins, Some Suggestions for Future Plaintiffs on Extending the
Scope of the National Environmental Policy Act, 24 U. KAN. L. REV. 307 (1976);
Comment, Planning Level and Program Impact Statements Under the National Environ-
mental Policy Act: A Definitional Approach, 23 U.C.L.A.L REv. 124 (1975); Note,
Project-Program Relationships Used to Define Applicable Scope of Section 102(2)(C)
of NEPA, 23 U. KAN. L. REV. 342 (1975).
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such diverse fields as atomic energy,30 sewage facilities, "1 low-cost hous-
ing, 2 and highway planning."3
In deciding upon a challenge to the scope of an impact statement, a
court is faced with a fait accompli-the judge must decide not upon the
desirability of an impact statement of different scope, but the adequacy
of the analysis given the unit selected by the responsible official. This
decision is based on a series of inquiries. If the impact statement was
prepared upon an individual project, is a program statement necessary for
adequate evaluation? Will one program statement suffice, or are both a
program statement and a project statement necessary? If a program
statement is mandated, should it be prepared immediately, or must
planners await future developments before meaningful analysis can
proceed? Finally, should the challenged project be halted pending
environmental evaluation of the program of which it is a part? To
answer these questions, the courts have utilized several criteria, which
will now be considered.
CURRENTLY USED CRITERIA: AN INADEQUATE Focus
Even before NEPA became law, challenges to the scope of project
evaluation were raised under section 4(f) of the Department of Trans-
portation Act," which prohibits the Secretary of Transportation from
approving highway segments which pass through park lands unless he
has determined that there is no feasible and prudent alternative. In one
such case, Named Individual Members of the San Antonio Conservation
Society v. Texas Highway Department,5 an expressway had been divid-
ed into three segments, with the middle one passing through park lands.
The Court of Appeals for the Fifth Circuit expressly disapproved of
such segmentation, pointing out that construction of the two end seg-
ments would "make destruction of further parklands inevitable."30 The
significance of San Antonio Conservation Society was the court's recog-
nition that the segmentation adopted would severely circumscribe, if not
eliminate, the alternatives to construction of the final segment through
the park lands. 7
30. See Murphy, supra note 23, at 988-89.
31. See Comment, Four Years of Environmental Impact Statements: A Review of
Agency Administration of NEPA, 8 AKRON L. REv. 545, 561 (1975).
32. See Ackerman, Impact Statements and Low Cost Housing, 46 S. CAL. L. REv.
754, 795-99 (1973).
33. See Comment, Environmental Analysis and Reporting in Highway System
Planning, 121 U. PA. L. REV. 875 (1973).
34. 49 U.S.C. § 1653(f) (1970).
35. 446 F.2d 1013 (5th Cir.), cert. denied, 403 U.S. 932 (1971).
36. 446 F.2d at 1023.
37. Accord, Citizens Comm. for the Hudson Valley v. Volpe, 302 F. Supp. 1083
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Segmentation of highway programs as in San Antonio Conserva-
tion Society, far from being atypical, seems to be endemic2a8 To counter-
act the tendency towards piecemeal analysis, and in response to a
number of statutory mandates,3" the Federal Highway Administration
revised Policy and Procedures Memorandum (PPM) 90-14o by promul-
gating new regulations which mandated environmental evaluation of a
highway section "as long as practicable to permit consideration of
environmental matters on a broad scope. 41  A highway section, in
turn, was defined as "a substantial length of highway between logical
termini."4"
The Eighth Circuit drew heavily upon PPM 90-1 when faced with
a challenge to an impact statement prepared for a section of freeway in
Indian Lookout Alliance v. Volpe." Interpreting PPM 90-1 to require
the independent utility of a highway section when isolated from the
remainder of the program, the court held that the section was inappro-
priate-not ending in major termini, it could have no independent
utility.44 The guidelines of PPM 90-1 and the independent utility
(S.D.N.Y. 1969). In Citizens Committee the Corps of Engineers was planning con-
struction of a freeway along the Hudson River, which would require construction of both
a dike and a causeway. The court held that the Corps would have to obtain approval for
both the dike and the causeway before construction of either could begin. If the dike
were already constructed, the Secretary of Transportation would be limited in the
alternatives he could consider under section 4(f) of the DOT Act, 49 U.S.C. § 1653(f)
(1970).
38. See, e.g., Citizens to Preserve Overton Park v. Volpe, 401 U.S. 402 (1971); Daly
v. Volpe, 514 F.2d 1106 (9th Cir. 1975); Ecology Center of La., Inc. v. Coleman, 515
F.2d 860 (5th Cir. 1975); Swain v. Brinegar, 517 F.2d 766 (7th Cir. 1975).
The tendency to divide highways into sections has been ascribed to the long-range
planning process, which proceeds from comprehensive system-wide analysis to an in-
creasingly detailed design focusing on a single section of highway, and to the funding
process, by which funds must be used within two years of appropriation and only for the
particular project for which they are earmarked. See Comment, supra note 33, at 877,
880-81; Note, Federal-Aid Highway Construction and the National Environmental
Policy Act of 1969, 3 N.Y.U. REv. L. & SoCUL CHANGE 11, 19-20 (1973).
It has been suggested that the Department of Transportation has become more
responsive to the need for broader program statements, Hearings on NEPA Oversight 54,
as evidenced by the decreasing number of impact statements filed for highway projects.
Id. at 211.
39. Section 106 of the Historic Preservation Act of 1966, 16 U.S.C. § 470(f) (1970);
section 309 of the Clean Air Act of 1970, 42 U.S.C. § 1857h-7 (1970); NEPA, 42
U.S.C. §§ 4331 et seq.; section 4(f) of the DOT Act, 40 U.S.C. § 1653(f) (1970).
40. 39 Fed. Reg. 41,804 (1974). The revisions are embodied in 23 C.F.R. Part 771
(1975).
41. 23 C.F.R. § 771.5(a) (1975).
42. 23 C.F.R. § 771.3(g) (1975).
43. 484 F.2d 11 (8th Cir. 1973).
44. Id. at 19.
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analysis of Indian Lookout Alliance have continued to dominate the
judicial response to environmental litigation over highway segments.45
As environmentalists challenged an increasing number and variety
of project impact statements, the courts turned to the highway prece-
dents for principles to identify the appropriate scope for an impact
statement, in the belief that the independent utility criterion could be
applied readily outside the highway context.4" The apparent simplicity
of this criterion proved somewhat deceptive, however, as may be seen in
Sierra Club v. Callaway47 (Wallisville Dam), wherein the Fifth Circuit
reversed a lower court holding that the Wallisville Dam project, a dam
and reservoir on the Trinity River in Texas, had been improperly
segmented from the Trinity River navigation and flood control program.
While affirming the finding that the impact statement was inadequate
in other respects, 48 the Fifth Circuit specifically disapproved of the
district court's decision that the project had been improperly segmented
from the Trinity system. 49  Pointing out that Congress had relied upon
the local purposes of the Wallisville Dam in the appropriations process,
the court held that the evidence adequately established the local utility of
the project, and the dam was viewed as a separate viable entity.50
One of two lessons may be drawn from Wallisville Dam: either
the independent utility criterion is so ambiguous that it is impossible to
predict how a court will apply it, or the Fifth Circuit has defined
independent utility so broadly that a project impact statement seldom
will be held to be improperly segmented. 5' The accuracy of the second
conclusion, that most project statements will be sustained under the
independent utility criterion, is suggested by the results in subsequent
cases.
The Tenth Circuit, in Sierra Club v. Stamm,52 found adequate an
45. In 1975, the Ninth Circuit in Daly v. Volpe, 514 F.2d 1106 (9th Cir. 1975),
while acknowledging an element of arbitrariness in selection of the termini mentioned in
the regulations, found the challenged segmentation justified by the PPM criteria and the
independent local utility of the segment. Id. at 1110-11. The Department of Transpor-
tation continues to utilize the independent utility criterion to determine the scope of an
impact statement. Hearings on NEPA Oversight 54.
46. See, e.g., Citizens Against the Destruction of Napa v. Lynn, 391 F. Supp. 1188,
1193 (N.D. Cal. 1975) ("The soundest approach to the highway cases in a non-highway
context is to extract the common sense tests the courts in those cases employed").
47. Sierra Club v. Froehlke, 359 F. Supp. 1289 (S.D. Tex. 1973), modified sub nom.
Sierra Club v. Callaway, 499 F.2d 982 (5th Cir. 1974).
48. 499 F.2d at 994.
49. Id. at 993.
50. Id. at 988-90.
51. Cf. Comment, supra note 29, at 144-46.
52. 507 F.2d 788 (10th Cir. 1974).
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impact statement prepared for the Strawberry Aqueduct project, despite
the fact that it was only one component of the Bonneville Unit water
collection system. The Bonneville system, in turn, was only one of six
components of the larger Central Utah Project. Finding that the Straw-
berry Aqueduct project could function independently of the remaining
unconstructed systems and that it was not so intertwined with the larger
program as to be a mere component, the Tenth Circuit held that the
project had independent utility and that accordingly no further environ-
mental evaluation was necessary.5  The opinion lacks an adequate
factual description of the project to permit proper evaluation of the
decision, but some degree of independent utility can be attributed to
most public works projects.
A more troubling result was reached by the Ninth Circuit in Trout
Unlimited v. Morton,54 in which environmental groups challenged an
impact statement prepared for the first of two phases of the Teton Basin
Project. The first phase consisted of construction of a dam and reser-
voir and disposition of the first half of the irrigation water made
available by the project, while the second phase consisted of disposition
of the remainder of the irrigation water. Asking whether there was
such a dependency between the two phases that it would be irrational or
unwise "to undertake the first phase if subsequent phases were not also
undertaken, ' '5s the court answered that the first phase was feasible
whether or not the second phase was launched. 0 While the court's
finding of independent utility of the first phase may be correct, this
cannot be said of the second phase, which was absolutely impossible
without construction of the dam.
The generic problem presented by Trout Unlimited is that of excess
capacity-an initial project, ostensibly with independent utility, is de-
signed to be compatible with later projects. Together, the projects form
a system with considerably broader uses and impacts than originally
asserted for the first project. Illustrative of this problem was the pro-
posed reconstruction of Locks and Dam 26, enjoined in Atchison, To-
peka & Santa Fe Railway v. Callaway."7 Part of the navigational system
on the upper Mississippi River, Locks and Dam 26, was to be rebuilt
and increased in capacity. The impact statement prepared for the
53. Id.at 791.
54. 509 F.2d 1276 (9th Cir. 1974).
55. Id. at 1285.
56. Id.; accord, Sierra Club v. Froehlke, 392 F. Supp. 130 (E.D. Mo. 1975);
Environmental Defense Fund, Inc. v. Armstrong, 356 F. Supp. 131 (N.D. Cal.), aff'd,
487 F.2d 814 (9th Cir. 1973).
57. 382 F. Supp. 613 (D.D.C. 1974).
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project was challenged on the ground that it was the first step in a multi-
billion dollar, systemwide program to expand the system to accommo-
date larger barges and increase river traffic. Rejecting the argument
that the independent utility of the project rendered further evaluation
unnecessary, the court held that systemwide evaluation was required
before the project could proceed.5" Atchison, Topeka & Santa Fe
graphically illustrates a serious defect of the independent utility criteri-
on. While use of the step-by-step approach adopted by the Corps of
Engineers in studying Locks and Dam 26 makes possible the fragment-
ed analysis of independent projects, the comprehensive system of which
the projects are a part may escape environmental evaluation altogether,
or at best may be studied too late for serious consideration of alterna-
tives.
A further criticism of the independent utility criterion is its difficul-
ty of application. Unless the concept is construed as broadly as it was
in Wallisville Dam, it is extremely difficult to quantify the benefits
derived from a project, categorize them as local or systemwide, and
balance the purely local benefits against the wider benefits. 59 There is
an element of arbitrariness in such categorization, as there may be in
definition of the scope of the project itself,10 which lends itself to the
possibility of manipulation of project scope and benefits to ensure
project approval.' The most devastating criticism of the independent
utility criterion, however, is that satisfaction of the criterion is not
sufficient to ensure that the environmental impact of a project has been
adequately analyzed. To demonstrate why this is so, it is necessary to
58. Id. at 621.
59. See Citizens Against the Destruction of Napa v. Lynn, 391 F. Supp. 1188, 1194
(N.D. Cal. 1975) ("[The independent utility criterion] is an exceedingly difficult test to
carry over to the instant facts").
60. Daly v. Volpe, 514 F.2d 1106, 1110 (9th Cir. 1975). The arbitrariness of
dividing the Teton Basin Project into two phases, see text accompanying notes 54-56
supra, is patent.
61. See Named Individual Members of the San Antonio Conservation Soc'y v. Texas
Highway Dep't, 446 F.2d 1013 (5th Cir.), cert. denied, 403 U.S. 932 (1971); Appalachi-
an Mountain Club v. Brinegar, 394 F. Supp. 105, 115 (D.N.H. 1975):
1-93 has become a classic example of segmentation. By proposing uncontro-
versial segments of the highway, one per [impact statement], and leaving the
most controversial segment for last, the FHWA is able to 'build' a case, by
constructing the bulk of an interstate system, for the completion of construc-
tion of the final segment of the system. In this case, that last segment will be
Franconia Notch, which is a major environmental issue in New England ....
See generally Conservation Soc'y of S. Vt., Inc. v. Secretary of Transp., 508 F.2d 927,
935 (2d Cir. 1974), vacated sub nom. Coleman v. Conservation Soc'y of S. Vt., Inc., 96
S. Ct. 19 (1975), rev'd, 531 F.2d 637 (2d Cir. 1976), in which the court pointed out
that even if a highway segment had independent utility, the regulations still call for an
impact statement on as long a segment as practicable. See note 41 supra.
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consider two additional criteria-the irreversible and irretrievable com-
mitment of resources to a project, and the foreclosure of alternatives to
the action.
COMMITMENT OF RESOURCES AND
FORECLOSURE OF ALTERNATIVES
NEPA mandates that the impact statement include consideration of
"alternatives to the proposed action," 2 and "any irreversible and irre-
trievable commitments of resources which would be involved in the
proposed action should it be implemented."6" As courts examined the
appropriate scope of an impact statement, these two factors were grad-
ually adopted as criteria to guide their inquiry. Under the criterion of
foreclosure of alternatives, the project evaluated in the impact statement
is too narrow if completion of the project will foreclose the possibility of
various alternatives for subsequent projects within the program. Ac-
cording to the commitment-of-resources criterion, if completion of a
project entails an irreversible and irretrievable commitment of resources
to completion of the program as a whole, the entire program must be
evaluated before approval of the project.
The Court of Appeals for the District of Columbia Circuit gave
careful consideration to these two criteria in the landmark case of
Scientists' Institute for Public Information, Inc. v. Atomic Energy Com-
mission 4 (SIPI), which has been called the "leading case analyzing
NEPA's 'irreversible commitment' language.""e'  Rejecting the AEC's
claim that its long-range Liquid Metal Fast Breeder Reactor (LMFBR)
program06 could be adequately evaluated in statements for individual
facilities, the court ordered preparation of an impact statement for the
overall program. The court alluded to the massive capital investment
necessary for the program, and pointed out that this irretrievable com-
mitment of resources tended to shift the balance of environmental and
economic costs and benefits in favor of completion of the program.67
Moreover, by virtue of the long lead times involved in modem technol-
ogical research, the choice of developing one application was seen as
inevitably precluding development of others."5 Through this commit-
62. 42 U.S.C. § 4332(2) (C) (iii) (1970).
63. Id. § 4332(2)(C)(v) (1970).
64. 481 F.2d 1079 (D.C. Cir. 1973).
65. Friends of the Earth v. Coleman, 513 F.2d 295, 299 (9th Cir. 1975).
66. The LMFBR program is described in SIPI, 481 F.2d at 1082-84.
67. Id. at 1090. The court also pointed out that as government sponsored technolo-
gy matures, vested interests begin to develop in implementation of the technology. Id. at
1089 n.43.
68. "The manner in which we divide our limited research and development dollars
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ment of resources and foreclosure of alternatives, concluded the court,
the program as a whole has an effect on the environment apart from its
component parts, and an impact statement must therefore be prepared
for the program itself."
SIPI is one of the few cases in which there was a truly absolute
foreclosure of alternatives. Given the time and capital necessary to
develop the technology for a commercially feasible method of generating
power, the choices made in 1976 will indeed determine the type of
technology available in 1995.70 More commonly, however, completion
of a contemplated project will not render alternatives to the broader
program absolutely impossible; rather, such alternatives may become
highly unlikely.7 1 Typical of such cases was the proposed construction of
two end segments of an expressway up to the opposite sides of park
lands, a segmentation rejected by the Fifth Circuit in San Antonio
Conservation Society. 2 Construction of the end segments would not
have rendered impossible an alternative location for the entire express-
way, but it was highly unlikely that the segments would be entirely
abandoned and a new expressway constructed.73  Foreclosure of alter-
natives, accordingly, rather than a unitary criterion or test, is a sliding
scale, on which the project may range from improbable to absolutely
impossible.74
today among various promising technologies in effect determines what technologies will
be available, and what type and amount of environmental effects will have to be endured,
in the future when we must apply some new technology to meet projected energy
demand." Id. at 1090.
69. Id. at 1090-91. Before ordering preparation of an impact statement, the court
considered the ripeness of the program for environmental evaluation. See note 135 infra
and accompanying text.
70. For example, the Energy Research and Development Administration has budget-
ed more money for the development of the LMFBR, which is not expected to become
commercially available until 1990, than for all other energy alternatives combined. 5
BNA ENVIRONMENTAL REP. CuRRENT DEVELOPMENTS 1801 (Mar. 14, 1975). Cf.
SIPI, 481 F.2d at 1090.
71. See Friends of the Earth v. Coleman, 513 F.2d 295, 300 (9th Cir. 1975)
(completion of early project will "most likely determine" location of later project); No
East-West Highway Comm. v. Whitaker, 403 F. Supp. 260, 270 (D.N.H. 1975) (It is
"highly probable" that completion of initial phases of program "will have a coercive
effect on further highway construction. . ."). See note 74 infra.
72. 446 F.2d 1013 (5th Cir.), cert. denied, 403 U.S. 932 (1971). See notes 35-37
supra and accompanying text.
73. Moreover, even if alternatives were not absolutely precluded, there was present
an irretrievable and irreversible commitment of resources to the program.
74. The degree of foreclosure of alternatives determines the position of a project
upon this sliding scale, as may be seen in Friends of the Earth v. Coleman, 513 F.2d 295
(9th Cir. 1975). Environmentalists in that case challenged the decision of state
highway officials, who were planning a segment of interstate highway, to obtain the fill
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Commitment of resources to the more expansive breeder reactor
program in the SIPI case involved a corollary foreclosure of alternative
approaches to development of new energy technology. Recognizing the
relationship between these two criteria, most courts have applied them
together. These courts, however, have overlooked the relationship be-
tween the commitment of resources involved in a project and the inde-
pendent utility of the project. If a project has no independent utility of
its own, all resources devoted to the project will be lost unless the entire
program of which it is a part is completed, thus effectively creating an
irreversible and irretrievable commitment of resources to completion of
the program. In SIPI, development of the technology for the reactors
had no utility unless the program was completed through the construc-
tion of such reactors on a commercial basis, and thus there was an
irretrievable commitment of resources. Likewise, there was an absolute
foreclosure of alternatives to the program.75
In contrast, if a project does have an independent utility apart from
the broader program of which it is a part, its completion does not in
reality constitute a commitment of resources to the broader program-
the resources dedicated or "sunk into" the project are productively
employed whatever decision is made concerning the broader program,
and their commitment is neither irreversible nor irretrievable. 76
needed for the highway from the site of a proposed canal. The environmentalists
claimed that the fill excavations would foreclose alternatives to construction of the canal.
Acknowledging that if the canal were built, the excavations would "most likely"
determine the course of the canal, the Ninth Circuit nevertheless pointed out that the
presence of the excavations would not affect the possibility of not building the canal,
since contingent plans had been made to convert the excavations into fish hatcheries. Id.
at 300. The significance of the contingency plans regarding the hatchery was that
resources committed to making the excavations could be productively employed and not
regarded as "lost" if an alternative to the original program were adopted, thus alleviating
any potential pressure to complete the canal to prevent the loss. The existence of a
sliding scale makes a precise application of the foreclosure of alternatives test extremely
difficult.
75. By contrast, completion of the proposed highway segments in San Antonio
Conservation Society, which also had no independent utility, would not render alternative
routes to the expressway absolutely impossible, but highly improbable. See notes 72-73
supra and accompanying text.
76. It was for this reason that in Friends of the Earth v. Coleman the Ninth Circuit
rejected the claim that obtaining the fill from the canal site so linked it with the highway
project that both must be evaluated together. The court stated that the highway project
involved no commitment of resources to the canal project, since the funds would have to
be expended to obtain the fill anyway, and the canal site was the cheapest source. 513
F.2d 295, 300 (9th Cir. 1975).
If the capacity of a project is greater than that required for purely local demand,
however, the excess capacity does represent a commitment of resources to completion of
the broader program. See text accompanying notes 57-58 supra. Cf. No East-West
Highway Comm. v. Whitaker, 403 F. Supp. 260 (D.N.H. 1975).
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The Second Circuit in its first decision in Conservation Society of
Southern Vermont, Inc. v. Secretary of Transportation7 (Conservation
Society I), held that despite a project's independent utility, it entailed an
irretrievable commitment of resources to a broader program. In Con-
servation Society I the court ordered the evaluation of the environmental
impact of expressway development throughout a 280 mile corridor prior
to construction of a twenty-seven mile segment of highway. 8 While
acknowledging that the segment had independent utility, the Second
Circuit echoed the district court's concern over the irretrievable commit-
ment of funds to local highway projects without evaluation of highway
development along the entire corridor. 79 The assertion that a project
with independent utility entails an irretrievable commitment of resources
to a larger program appears to be misguid6d, but the court alluded to an
additional factor which provided support for its decision to enjoin
construction of the highway segment. Construction of isolated seg-
ments of the expressway, the district court had observed, would induce
traffic along the entire route, creating demand for completion of the
entire program.80 Thus, despite the independent utility of the project
enjoined in Conservation Society I, the completion of several such
projects would generate an impetus for the construction of the remain-
ing segments of the program.
Conservation Society I was vacated and remanded by the Supreme
Court,8' and in Conservation Society I1 the Second Circuit reversed its
earlier holding.8 2  Reasoning that since the project had independent
utility it involved no irretrievable commitment of resources, the court
concluded that no corridor impact statement was required. In so
deciding, the circuit court apparently overlooked its earlier concern 3
that pressure would be generated for completion of the expressway along
the entire corridor. Also disregarded was the shift in cost/benefit
analysis which occurs as early segments of a program are
77. 362 F. Supp. 627 (D. Vt. 1973), aff'd, 508 F.2d 927 (2d Cir. 1974), vacated sub
noin. Coleman v. Conservation Soe'y of S. Vt., Inc., 96 S. Ct. 19 (1975), rev'd, 531 F.2d
637 (2d Cir. 1976).
78. 508 F.2d at 927, 934-36.
79. Id. at 935. Also crucial to the decision was the district court finding that
construction of a superhighway through the three-state corridor was a long-range goal of
the respective states and the federal government, acting in partnership. Id. at 934. See
notes 90-91 infra and accompanying text.
80. 362 F. Supp. at 636. Accord, Appalachian Mountain Club v. Brinegar, 394 F.
Supp. 105, 119 (D.N.H. 1975).
81. 96 S. Ct. 19 (1975).
82. 531 F.2d 637 (2d Cir. 1976).
83. See text accompanying note 80 supra,
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completed: once a project is completed, only incremental cost is rele-
vant in weighing the costs of the remainder of the program against its
benefits, and completion of the program becomes more attractive.84
The pressure to complete subsequent projects and the shift in
cost/benefit analysis which accompany a project entailing irreversible
and irretrievable commitment of resources to a broader program reflect
the true concern that completion of an early project will dictate or cause
the environmental damage of a subsequent project.8 The arguable
conclusion is that the analytical focus in determining the scope of an
impact statement should shift to meet this broader concern more direct-
ly.86 A further conclusion which may be drawn is that although a
finding of independent project utility is necessary to ensure that the
impact statement is broad enough in scope, it is not sufficient; the
inquiry must proceed further. A finding of independent utility guaran-
tees that there will be no irretrievable commitment of resources; 87 it does
not guarantee, however, that there will be no pressure to complete
subsequent projects or that there will be no shift in the cost/benefit
ratio. Accordingly, while it is correct to conclude that a project which
has no independent utility is too narrow to be evaluated separately, it is
erroneous to conclude that a project's environmental effects can be
adequately evaluated solely because it has independent utility.88
EXISTENCE OF A PROGRAM PLAN
An alternative approach adopted by a few courts, 9 often in con-
84. See Scientists' Institute for Pub. Information, Inc. v. AEC, 481 F.2d 1079, 1089
n.43 (D.C. Cir. 1973); Rhode Island Comm. on Energy v. Government Services Admin-
istration, 397 F. Supp. 41, 61 (D.R.I. 1975).
85. Cf. Citizens Against the Destruction of Napa v. Lynn, 391 F. Supp. 1188, 1194
(N.D. Cal. 1975), in which the court employed what it called the "coercive effects" test,
asking whether completion of a proposed project would coerce the completion of an
additional project.
86. Such an approach is developed in the text accompanying note 118 infra.
87. See text accompanying note 76 supra. There is no irretrievable commitment of
resources subject to the caveat discussed in note 76 supra, i.e., so long as project capacity
does not exceed the local or independent demand.
88. See Citizens for Balanced Environment and Transp. v. Volpe, 503 F.2d 601, 606
(2d Cir. 1974) (Winter, J., dissenting), cert. denied, 96 S. CL 135 (1975); Appalachian
Mountain Club v. Brinegar, 394 F. Supp. 105, 117 (D.N.H. 1975) ("The concepts of
'independent utility' or 'logical termini' are not talismans that truncate the natural scope
of an EIS").
89. E.g., Sierra Club v. Morton, 514 F.2d 856 (D.C. Cir. 1975), cert. granted sub
nom. Kleppe v. Sierra Club, 96 S. Ct. 722 (1976); Conservation Soc'y of S. Vt., Inc. v.
Secretary of Transp., 508 F.2d 927 (2d Cir. 1974), vacated sub nom. Coleman v.
Conservation Soe'y of S. Vt., Inc., 96 S. Ct. 19 (1975), rev'd, 531 F.2d 637 (2d Cir.
1976); No East-West Highway Comm. v. Whitaker, 403 F. Supp. 260 (D.N.H. 1975).
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junction with the commitment of resources and foreclosure of alterna-
tives tests, is to look for activities by federal officials which might
constitute major federal action. Confronted by the challenge that a
project is too narrowly segmented, a court utilizing this approach would
seek evidence that the project is part of a broader program consciously
planned by federal officials. Convincing evidence of such a plan would
dictate preparation of an impact statement on the overall program
before the project could be completed.
The existence of a program plan was an important factor in the
Second Circuit's decision to require a program impact statement in
Conservation Society L Critical to that holding was the lower court
finding that completion of a limited access superhighway through Con-
necticut, Massachusetts, and Vermont was viewed by the respective state
highway departments as a long-range goalY0  Despite the absence of a
federal plan, the court found that federal officials had knowledge of the
overall planning process and to a considerable extent worked in partner-
ship with state officials." Relying on this evidence of a federal-state
"partnership," the Second Circuit held that ordering a program-wide
impact statement was justified because of the commitment of resources
and foreclosure of alternatives involved in the project .2
In light of the vacation of Conservation Society I," and the Su-
preme Court's accompanying admonition to reconsider the case in light
of Aberdeen and Rockfish R.R. v. Students Challenging Regulatory
Agency Procedures9 (SCRAP), the Second Circuit repudiated its ear-
lier approach and reversed itself in Conservation Society 1.95 Seizing
upon the holding of SCRAP that a federal agency must prepare an
impact statement at "the time at which it makes a recommendation or
report on a proposal for federal action,' 9 6 the Second Circuit pointed
out that there had been no finding of an "overall federal plan" by the
90. 362 F. Supp. 627, 636 (D. Vt. 1973).
91. Id. The Second Circuit refused to disturb this finding by the lower court, asking
only if ordering an impact statement on the highway over the entire 280 mile corridor
was within the discretion of the judge. 508 F.2d at 934.
92. 508 F.2d at 935. The approach of the Second Circuit in Conservation Society I
was followed by the District Court of New Hampshire in No East-West Highway Comm.
v. Whitaker, 403 F. Supp. 260 (D.N.H. 1975). Finding a state plan and an "amor-
phous" federal goal of constructing an east-west highway across New Hampshire, the
court held that NEPA would require an impact statement on the entire highway before
further construction of any of the segments; however, the'court withheld a decision on
the merits because the case was not yet ripe. See note 135 infra.
93. Coleman v. Conservation Soc'y of S. Vt., Inc., 96 S. Ct. 19 (1975).
94. 422 U.S. 289 (1975).
95. 531 F.2d 637 (2d Cir. 1976).
96. 422 U.S. at 320 (emphasis in original).
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district court," and accordingly found no need for a corridor impact
statement.98
Sierra Club v. Morton99 (Northern Great Plains), contains the
most comprehensive treatment of the program plan approach to deter-
mining the scope of an impact statement. Concerned over the impend-
ing massive development of the Northern Great Plains, one of the world's
richest coal basins, the Sierra Club and other groups sought an order
requiring the Departments of the Interior, Agriculture, and the Army to
prepare a comprehensive regional impact statement before granting any
permits and licenses which would allow development of the area.100 The
97. 531 F.2d at 639.
98. Id. Although the Supreme Court had remanded Conservation Society I for
reconsideration in light of SCRAP (a second ground for the vacation and remand was
Pub. L. No. 94-83, 89 Stat. 424, legislatively overruling the rigid standard evolved by the
Second Circuit for federal involvement in the preparation and drafting of impact state-
ments), it is questionable whether the holding in SCRAP required the reversal of
Conservation Society 1. SCRAP grew out of an increase in railway freight rates which
became effective in February, 1972. Plaintiff SCRAP charged that the underlying
freight rates discriminated against recyclable material in favor of virgin materials, and
that the increase further exacerbated the situation. After the Interstate Commerce
Commission announced that it was studying the environmental effects of the underlying
rate structure in a separate investigation, SCRAP sought an injunction to restrain the
rate increase pending completion of such a comprehensive evaluation. The Supreme
Court held that a comprehensive impact statement was not yet necessary, citing the
following factors: the ICC had undertaken an evaluation of the entire rate structure in a
separate proceeding; the rate increase was a general percentage increase, and thus
facially neutral; and the ICC had broad discretion in deciding what issues to address in a
general revenue proceeding. 422 U.S. at 325. None of these factors was present in
Conservation Society I. By contrast, it was unlikely that there would ever be a
comprehensive evaluation of the development of Route 7 throughout its 280 mile
corridor; each highway construction project, far from being facially neutral, had detri-
mental environmental consequences; and broad discretion comparable to that traditional-
ly afforded the ICC was not involved.
A CEQ memorandum to the heads of agencies concerning the SCRAP case
expresses the CEQ position that the decision is limited to its unique facts, and requires
no general change in agency NEPA procedures. Council on Environmental Quality,
Memorandum to the Heads of Agencies (Nov. 26, 1975), reprinted in Hearings on
NEPA Oversight 246-47. Cf. Nolan, The National Environmental Policy Act After
United States v. SCRAP: The Timing Question and Substantive Review, 4 HopsixA L.
REv. 213, 243 (1976); Note, SCRAP II: No Excuse for NEPA Foot-Dragging, 5 ENv.
L. REP. 10126, 10128 (1975) ("All aspects of the Supreme Court's reversal of the
district court decision rest on the unique character of the ICC's 'general revenue
proceeding"').
99. 514 F.2d 856 (D.C. Cir. 1975), cert. granted sub nom. Kleppe v. Sierra Club, 96
S. Ct. 772 (1976).
100. 514 F.2d at 867. Plaintiffs pointed to language in the CEQ Guidelines calling
for a comprehensive impact statement "whenever a group of individual federal projects
are related geographically, environmentally, or programmatically." 40 C.F.R. §
1500.6(d) (1) (1975).
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Court of Appeals for the District of Columbia Circuit first alluded to its
earlier holding in SIPI1 10 that the cumulative effect of a series of federal
actions can itself constitute a major federal action which requires evalua-
tion in an impact statement, and then cast the issue as "whether to
extend SIPI to require comprehensive impact statements in situations
where the responsible agencies deny they are engaged in a broad pro-
gram."' °2 Stating that the requirement for an impact statement cannot
turn simply on whether the agency has denominated a series of activities
a "program," 103 -the court held that the government agencies had treated
development of the region and issuance of leases in the region in such a
way that their actions comprised, cumulatively, a regional program
constituting major federal action.10 4  The court refused to order an
impact statement, however. The case was remanded to the district
court to allow the federal agencies to make a final decision on the role
they would play in the region and to determine at what point the
program would be ripe for evaluation.l0r
In his dissenting opinion, Judge MacKinnon took exception to the
majority's reliance upon SIPI, pointing out that the crucial factor in both
SIPI and Conservation Society I was the "irretrievable commitment of
resources beyond what was actually expended in an individual
project."100 Judge MacKinnon was unable to find any such commit-
ment of resources in Northern Great Plains, viewing each development
as "essentially independent from developments elsewhere in the re-
gion." 0 7
The tension between the majority and the dissent in Northern
Great Plains arose from the fact that the majority found a major federal
action in the form of regional planning, but failed to define how this
action had a significant effect on the environment. Since an impact
statement is required only for actions significantly affecting -the environ-
101. See notes 64-69 supra and accompanying text.
102. 514 F.2d at 872.
103. Id. at 873.
104. Id. at 875. The court cited four items as evidence that the federal defendants
had treated their actions regionally: an effort to develop a comprehensive plan for
regional development; recognition by responsible officials in various agencies of the need
for comprehensive regional development; recognition of the need for cumulative study of
environmental effects as a result of federal planning to date; and urging of cumulative
environmental consideration of the area by the Environmental Protection Agency. Id. at
875-77 & n.28.
105. Id. at 880-82.
106. Id. at 887 (emphasis added). See notes 64-69, 77-80 supra and accompanying
text.
107. 514 F.2d at 888.
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ment, 10 8 a program statement should be required only if the program as
a whole has an impact greater than that of the individual projects which
comprise it. The only discussion of this critical point is in the footnote
rejoinder to the dissent, which stated that a relationship among develop-
ments within the region could be found in the irretrievable commitment
of limited water supplies to each project allowed, and the cumulative
effect of the population influx they would cause. 1 9 It seems likely that
the effects of each project within the region are interrelated,'" 0 but the
majority's gloss was clearly inadequate to establish this as a fact. '
108. 42 U.S.C. § 4332(2)(C) (1970).
109. 514 F.2d at 877 n.28. Judge MacKinnon's reply was twofold: the population
influx for each mine is an effect of that mine which must be evaluated in the impact
statement for that mine; and there had been no showing that the contemplated strip
mines had sufficient impact on regional water resources to foreclose alternatives. Id. at
889 n.12 (dissenting opinion of MacKinnon, J.). His population argument overlooked
the fact that there may be synergistic effects of the cumulative influx for a number of
mines, and also that if restricting population influx due to new mines is deemed
desirable, it should be done programmatically, to achieve optimum allocation of manpow-
er. His response to the commitment of scarce water resources assertion illustrated a
basic defect of the majority opinion: a failure to articulate specific ways in which the
impact of the entire program is greater than or different from the cumulative project
impacts.
110. The Sierra Club, in opposing the Justice Department's petition for review by the
Supreme Court, asserted that there are indeed such related effects at the regional level:
"None of the basic regional issues underlying the past and proposed federal actions
concerning coal development in the Northern Great Plains has ever been analyzed in any
environmental impact statement." Examples of such basic regional issues were stated to
be surface mining versus deep mining, transportation of coal, and allocation of scarce
water resources. 6 BNA ENVIRONMENTAL REP. CURRENT DEVELOPMENTS 1382 (Dec.
12, 1975). See also Hearings on NEPA Oversight 174; SIXTH ANNUAL REPORT OF THE
COUNCIL ON ENVIRONMENTAL QUALITY 544-57 (1975).
Officials within the Interior Department acknowledge the interrelationships among
projects which are geographically contiguous. Speaking of a complex of actions around
the Garrison Dam in North Dakota, Robert Jones of the Bureau of Land Management
pointed out that
These projects are interrelated. One project in the area might have accept-
able environmental consequences, but, if you have border-to-border projects
all the way across you have a substantially different environmental situation.
Hearings on NEPA Oversight 31.
111. A similar failure to articulate how project effects are interrelated is evident in
Cady v. Morton, 527 F.2d 786 (9th Cir. 1975). The Bureau of Indian Affairs had
approved a lease by the Crow Tribe of coal rights to 30,000 acres of land for ten years
or as long as coal could be produced in paying quantities. Instead of preparing an
impact statement for the entire 30,000 acres, the Interior Department prepared a state-
ment for the first mining plan submitted by the lessor, covering 770 acres of land for a
five year period. Stating that the effects of a 30,000 acre mining project over twenty
years or more differ significantly from the impact of a five year project covering only
770 acres, the Ninth Circuit held that an EIS was required for the approval of the overall
twenty year mining project planned by the lessor, as well as for each mining project
individually approved. Id. at 795. What is missing from the opinion is any explanation
of how the effects of the twenty year program differ from, or are cumulatively greater
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Because of this defect in its analytical framework, the majority was not
convincing in its attempt to distinguish earlier cases which refused to
order a program impact statement. 11 2 This distinction was grounded on
the assertion -that the earlier cases had considered the propriety of an
injunction against an individual project, 113 and none had involved a
direct challenge to the need for a regional statement,' 1 4 a proposition
which the dissent, with good reason, called "a classic example of a
distinction without a difference.""15
Evident in Northern Great Plains is the primary defect of the
program plan approach to determining the appropriate scope for an
impact statement: the need for environmental evaluation does not turn
upon the existence or non-existence of comprehensive planning. If the
than, the impacts of each separate mining plan. The only attempt at such an explana-
tion is the conclusory statement that "the breadth and scope of the possible projects made
possible by the Secretary's approval of the leases require the type of comprehensive study
that NEPA mandates adequately to inform the Secretary of the possible environmental
consequences of his approval." Id. The result is made even more anomalous by the
court's holding that the impact statement prepared for the 770 acre tract was adequate,
Id. at 796-98, and that development of the tract under the five year project could proceed.
Id. at 798-99 n.12. However, if the 770 acre project statement is adequate, then that
project must have no effects not considered therein. If this is so, there can be no need
for a program statement (at least, not until an adequate project statement is prepared).
Cf. note 113 infra.
112. See 514 F.2d at 878-79 n.29. Of particular interest is the majority's treatment
of Sierra Club v. Callaway (Wallisville Dam), 499 F.2d 982 (5th Cir. 1974); Sierra
Club v. Stamm (Strawberry Aqueduct), 507 F.2d 788 (10th Cir. 1974); and Trout
Unlimited v. Morton, 509 F.2d 1276 (9th Cir. 1974). (See notes 47-57 supra and
accompanying text for discussion of these cases.) The majority pointed to the differing
facts in each of the cases, and stated that each project challenged in these cases was
found to have sufficient independent utility to warrant treating it separately from the
larger program of which it was a part. 514 F.2d at 878 n.29. The majority offered no
explanation why the facts of the cases serve to distinguish them. Independent utility is a
most unsatisfactory distinction, for projects having independent utility may be combined
to make up an overall program planned by federal officials, and the existence of such a
federal plan or regional treatment was the basis for the court's holding that a comprehen-
sive impact statement would be required in this case if the federal defendants continued
to treat development regionally. Judge MacKinnon was highly critical of the majority
treatment of these cases, finding them close factually to the case under consideration. Id.
at 889.
113. The dissent seized upon this point, suggesting that the need for a regional or
program impact statement could only be asserted in a challenge to a project statement,
presumably on the theory that if a program statement is necessary, any project statement
will be insufficient for its failure to consider the cumulative effects of all projects. id. at
887. This seems to be an unnecessary limitation upon such suits, for considerable effort
may go into a program before the first project impact statement is prepared, and by the
time of a possible judicial determination that a program statement is necessary, delaying
the entire program pending statement preparation may be extremely costly.
114. Id. at 878 n.29.
115. Id. at 889.
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need for an impact statement were determined by the scope of federal
planning, a reviewing court would be placed in a hopeless dilemma-
either to accept the agency's announced plan as the correct unit of
environmental evaluation, or else to embark upon an effort to determine
what should be the extent of federal planning, a role eschewed even by
the Northern Great Plains court."' If an impact statement must be
prepared for the Northern Great Plains development as a whole, it
is not because of the existence of a program plan at the federal level;
rather it is because the effects of the component projects are related to
one another in such a way that they can be adequately evaluated only at
the program level. 117 This suggests a more workable criterion for
determining the adequacy of the scope of an impact statement: inter-
relatedness of the impacts of component projects.
TOWARD A BROADER ANALYSIS-
ThR INTERRELATIONSHIP OF IMPACTS
Analysis thus far has shown the separate criteria developed by the
courts to be inadequate guides to impact statement scope, and has
indicated that reviewing courts too often tend to limit their examination
to one or two factors, thereby neglecting important impacts of a project.
This suggests that consideration of the appropriate scope of an impact
statement must encompass a variety of factors, including the
following: one effect of an early project may be to create pressure to
complete the remaining projects, bringing on the effects of the later
projects;"18 completion of an early project may commit resources to the
program, shifting the balance of costs and benefits, and again creating
116. Appellants claimed in Northern Great Plains that an impact statement must be
filed if comprehensive planning by a federal agency should be underway, whether or not
the agency had in fact undertaken such planning. The court refused to rule on the claim
only because it held that the facts showed that regional development was contemplated
by the defendants. 514 F.2d at 875. The court acknowledged that requiring an impact
statement whenever comprehensive planning should be underway creates practical diffi-
culties, since an infinite number of plans are possible, and since several different
plaintiffs might seek evaluation of inconsistent plans. Id. at 874-75. Cf. Brief for
Petitioner at 46 n.37, Kleppe v. Sierra Club, 96 S. Ct. 772 (1976).
117. The Interior Department had prepared an impact statement to assess the impact
of its coal program on a nationwide basis, Brief for Petitioners at 7, Kleppe v. Sierra
Club, 96 S. Ct. 772 (1976), as well as a regional impact statement upon coal mining
within the Eastern Powder River Basin, id. at 9. The approach of the D.C. Circuit
Court leaves open the question why these impact statements are inadequate, and why a
statement is needed for the entire Northern Great Plains as well. Id. at 44. That
question can only be answered by exploring the relationship among the effects of all
proposed mining projects throughout the region.
118. See text accompanying note 80 supra.
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an impetus for completion of the remaining projects; 119 an early
project may foreclose alternatives, increasing the probability that the
effects of later projects will materialize;120 several projects may have a
synergistic effect, creating a cumulative impact greater than the sum of
their individual impacts;12' or, two or more projects may have a joint
impact.' 22  Each factor is essentially one form of link or relationship
which may exist between the impacts of two or more component projects
of a proposed program. The factors may be examined together, there-
fore, under the rubric of interrelationship of impacts, and when consi-
dered as a group, they indicate the appropriate scope for an impact
statement. Under this proposed analysis, a program impact statement
must be prepared if the environmental effects of the component projects
are related to one another in any way; if, however, the impacts of the
projects are unrelated, no impact statement need be prepared.
The seeds of the analysis are present in the well-reasoned opinion
of Judge Bownes of the District of New Hampshire in Appalachian
Mountain Club v. Brinegar.123 In -that case, environmentalists charged
that the impact statement prepared for the Littleton-Waterford segment
of an interstate highway near Franconia Notch State Park in New
Hampshire failed to discuss adequately the effect of construction of the
segment. '2 4  Judge Bownes rejected the defendant's argument that as-
sessment of effects beyond the vicinity of the segment was unnecessary
since the segment was of independent utility:
The concepts of "independent utility" or "logical termini" are not talis-
mans that truncate the natural scope of an [impact statement]. Reason
mandates that the defendants assess the environmental harm, if any,
that will occur to Franconia Notch if the Littleton-Waterford segment is
completed.' 25
119. See text accompanying notes 67, 84 supra.
120. See text accompanying note 68 supra.
121. E.g., Prince George's County v. Holloway, 404 F. Supp. 1181 (D.D.C. 1975),
holding inadequate an impact statement on a proposed transfer of the Navy's oceano-
graphic program to Bay St. Louis, Mississippi, for its failure to consider the cumulative
impact of the Navy transfer, and proposed transfer of Army and NASA personnel to the
same area.
122. See text accompanying notes 127-28 infra.
123. 394 F. Supp. 105 (D.N.H. 1975), continuing in effect an injunction imposed sub
nor. Society for the Protection of N.H. Forests v. Brinegar, 381 F. Supp. 282 (D.N.H.
1974).
124. Interstate highway 1-93 was completed up to Woodstock, N.H., less than three
miles from the entrance to the Franconia Notch State Park. A segment of 1-93 began
one mile north of the state park, and ran to Littleton, N.H. The proposed segments,
challenged in the instant case, would complete the highway from Littleton northward to
connect with 1-91.
125. 394 F. Supp. at 117.
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Limiting discussion of alternatives to the proposed Littleton-Waterford
segment was also held to be inadequate, and the defendants were
ordered to study alternatives which would not require construction of
the remaining segment of the highway through the state park. Judge
Bownes' decision was pervaded by an awareness of the interrelationship
between the impact of the proposed segment and the impact of eventual
completion of a final segment through Franconia Notch: construction
of ,the proposed Littleton-Waterford segment would increase the demand
for completion of the segment through the Notch; it would increase
traffic through the Notch, thus bringing about some of the eventual
effects of the final segment even before construction of the final seg-
ment; and it would tend to foreclose alternatives to completion of the
final segment. 26
The interrelationship of the impacts of two adjoining highway
segments was the decisive factor in Ecology Center of Louisiana, Inc. v.
Coleman,'27 in which the Fifth Circuit overturned a summary judgment
by the lower court that the highway project involved had been
properly segmented. Unconvinced that each highway segment had
independent utility, the court pointed to evidence that the environmental
impacts of each segment would interrelate to affect the entire area, and
remanded the case for decision whether the two segments of highway
should be considered as a whole.128
Analysis of the interrelationship of impacts of component projects
also serves to clarify the issues involved in Northern Great Plains.
Clearly, making expenditures for the development of one mining project
does not result in a commitment of those funds to the development of
other mining projects. If, however, there are limited water resources in
the region, scarce water supplies are irretrievably committed to each
126. Id. at 115, 117, 119.
127. 515 F.2d 860 (5th Cir.), rev'g in part and remanding Ecology Center of La.,
Inc. v. Brinegar, 7 E.R.C. 1254 (E.D. La. 1975).
128. Id. at 870. The court failed to explain why this fact would necessitate a
program statement. Presumably, an impact statement on both projects would be required
because the effects of the two segments would combine to create a cumulative impact
greater than the simple sum of the project effects. Also of interest is the statement that
the court would leave for consideration of the district court on remand possible
application of the doctrine it had announced in Sierra Club v. Callaway, 499 F.2d 982
(5th Cir. 1974), that the "practical necessities" of the situation may preclude preparation
of a broader program statement. 515 F.2d at 870 n.12. Insofar as the "practical
necessities" refer to the difficulty of obtaining sufficiently meaningful information to
prepare an impact statement, the issue is really not the need for a program statement but
the ripeness of preparation of a program statement. See text accompanying notes 134-35
infra. Surely, however, the practical necessities of a case cannot determine the need for
a program statement, since that question turns upon the relatedness of the impacts of the
component projects.
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mining project approved. This involves a corollary foreclosure of future
alternative mining projects, since allocation of water resources to earlier
projects precludes alternative projects which might be environmentally
preferable. 2 ' Finally, the population influx, degradation of air and
water quality, and development of transportation arteries, all of which
would result from the approval of a series of mining projects, will have a
cumulative impact greater than the impacts of each project. Only in a
comprehensive program impact statement could such interrelationships
be adequately explored, yet these issues were only touched upon in
Northern Great Plains.'
A similar failure to explore the interrelationship of the effects of
component projects is evident in Concerned About Trident v. Schlesin-
ger,'31 in which plaintiffs alleged a failure to prepare a program impact
statement for the Navy "Trident System," an improved nuclear
submarine/missile system. The Navy had decided to prepare an impact
statement for each component of the system, for the nuclear propulsion
system, and for the new support base at Bangor, Washington. The
court denied the plaintiffs request for a declaration that the Navy must
also prepare an impact statement for the system as a whole, and held
that the program, as distinguished from its components, did not have
any environmentally significant effects." 2  Given the finding that the
program as a whole had no effects apart from those of its components,
the result was surely correct. It seems more likely, however, that a
program as vast as the Trident program does involve foreclosure of
alternatives, that completion of early phases of the program would
generate considerable pressure for completion of later phases regardless
of the environmental consequences, that early projects commit resources
to the total program, and that a program impact statement is according-
ly appropriate.
Analysis of the interrelationship of impacts of challenged projects
is only the first step in resolution of litigation over the appropriate scope
of an impact statement. Unless the effects of component projects are
129. 514 F.2d at 877 n.28.
130. Id. A recent study indicates that the secondary impacts of coal development in
the Northern Great Plains will be the most significant effects of development within the
region. Significant impacts foreseen include: population increases which are large
compared to existing local populations; rapidly increasing demands for public services;
effects upon Indian reservations; and an acceleration of the urbanization process already
occurring in the region. Sm ANNUAL REPORT OF THE COUNCIL ON ENVIRONMENTAL
QUALIMY 136-37 (1975).
131. 400 F. Supp. 454 (D.D.C. 1975), appeal docketed, No.75-1515 (D.C. Cir.).
132. Id. at 490.
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essentially unrelated, 3  the court must decide if a program statement is
to be prepared, and if so, whether ongoing projects should be enjoined
pending its completion. Accordingly, the second step would be to
consider the ripeness of the program in order to determine whether
immediate preparation of a program impact statement would be appro-
priate or meaningful. The inquiry into ripeness for evaluation is the
product of two competing concerns: the importance of considering
environmental damage as early as possible, balanced against the futility
of evaluation before sufficiently meaningful information is available.13 4
In an effort to reconcile these countervailing considerations, the SIPI
court offered four factors which are appropriate in gauging ripeness in
the inquiry at hand: how likely it is that the program will be feasible
and how soon that will take place; how much information is available to
predict the environmental effects, whether irretrievable commitments are
being made and options foreclosed; and how severe the environmental
effects are likely to be. 3 ' If preparation of an impact statement is held
to be ripe, the third and final step would be to determine whether initial
project activity should be halted pending completion of the program
statement. This step would entail weighing the following factors to
decide if the purposes of NEPA would best be served by enjoining
project activity: the degree of interrelationship of the project impact
with other program impacts; the extent of environmental detriment
attendant to the project impact; the adequacy of environmental evalua-
tion already performed upon the project; and the equities of the case.130
133. See, e.g., Nucleus of Chicago Homeowners Ass'n v. Lynn, 524 F.2d 225 (7th
Cir. 1975), cert. denied, 96 S. Ct. 1462 (1976).
134. The SIPI court articulated the dilemma in the following way:
[We are pulled in two directions. Statements must be written late enough
in the development process to contain meaningful information, but they must
be written early enough so that whatever information is contained can
practically serve as an input into the decision making process. Scientists'
Institute for Pub. Information, Inc. v. AEC, 481 F.2d 1079, 1094 (D.C.
Cir. 1973).
135. Id. These four factors were again applied by the D.C. Circuit in the Northern
Great Plains case. The court felt that two of the factors indicated that the program to
develop the Great Plains was not sufficiently ripe for evaluation: it was impossible to tell
how likely it was that the program would be implemented since the government agencies
had not yet decided what role they would play in the region; and since the Department
of Interior had imposed a moratorium on most licensing in the area irretrievable
commitments of resources were largely being avoided. 514 F.2d at 880-81. A further
example of application of the four factor test is found in No East-West Highway Comm.,
Inc. v. Whitaker, 403 F. Supp. 260 (D.N.H. 1975). As in Northern Great Plains, the
court found the program not ripe for overall impact statement evaluation, since it was
unclear whether the state would proceed with the construction of the east-west highway
as alleged by plaintiffs.
136. See Aberdeen and Rockfish R.R. v. Students Challenging Regulatory Agency
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One effect of the three-step approach outlined above is to isolate
the factors relevant to the scope of an impact statement and to assign the
appropriate consequences to each factor. For example, while tradition-
al equitable principles have no relevance to whether or not a program
statement is required, the equities of the case should enter into a
determination whether to enjoin a project pending completion of evalua-
tion of the program as a whole.137 This approach has the advantage of
reducing the importance of characterization of an activity by the respon-
sible federal official, " " or of the funding of the program, and may in
fact call for a reevaluation of. the point at which a state project becomes
"federalized" for purposes of NEPA."19
Procedures (SCRAP), 422 U.S. 289 (1975) (discussed in note 98 supra). While
implicitly holding that an impact statement on the entire rate structure would be
necessary, the Supreme Court found such an inquiry inappropriate at that time, because
the challenged action had only an indirect environmental effect, and because the ICC
was already in the process of preparing an impact statement. Cf. Nolan, note 98 supra,
at 245-46.
Sierra Club v. Callaway, 499 F.2d 982 (5th Cir. 1974) is another case in which a
comprehensive environmental study was already underway, and in which the court
refused to enjoin further activity on the challenged project. In a number of cases the
courts have engaged in balancing the equities of the situation before deciding whether a
project should be enjoined pending preparation of a program statement. See Cady v.
Morton, 527 F.2d 786 (9th Cir. 1975). Compare Natural Resources Defense Council v.
TVA, 367 F. Supp. 122 (E.D. Tenn. 1973), aff'd, 502 F.2d 852 (6th Cir. 1974), with
Natural Resources Defense Council v. Morton, 388 F. Supp. 829 (D.D.C. 1974).
137. It has been suggested that in Wallisville Dam the Fifth Circuit looked to the
equities of the case in making its determination that completion of an impact statement
for the Trinity River Program was not necessary before commencing construction of the
Wallisville Dam. Note, supra note 29, at 358-59. Cf. Sierra Club v. Morton, 514 F.2d
856, 878 n.29 (D.C. Cir. 1975); Environmental Defense Fund v. Armstrong, 356 F.
Supp. 131, 140 (N.D. Cal.), afrd, 487 F.2d 814 (9th Cir. 1973).
138. It is odd that the D.C. Circuit should have placed such emphasis upon the
existence of regional planning in the Northern Great Plains case. See notes 103-05
supra and accompanying text. It would seem incongruous to suggest that had the federal
defendants made no effort to control the development of the area by regional planning,
there would be a diminished need for environmental evaluation. Surely the need for
program statements must turn upon the environmental effect or impact of the cumulative
actions taken and their interrelatedness, and not solely upon the treatment of the activi-
ties chosen by federal officials.
139. Since many public works projects are undertaken as joint state-federal activities,
there may be a question at what point the action has become sufficiently "federalized" to
require compliance with NEPA. One of the more bizarre examples of the conundrums
presented by this concept arose in the litigation over Route 7, a limited-access highway
through Massachusetts, Connecticut and Vermont. In 1972 environmentalists were
successful in winning an injunction against construction of a three-mile segment of Route
7 from Norwalk, Connecticut, north towards Danbury. Committee to Stop Route 7 v.
Volpe, 346 F. Supp. 731 (D. Conn. 1972). The court held that since the planners
wanted to connect Norwalk with Danbury, an impact statement had to be prepared for at
least this length of highway. Id. at 740. The state response was to plan construction of
the segment from Danbury north to New Milford using only state funds, holding in
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CONCLUSION
Under the analysis proposed in this Note, a court confronted by a
challenge to the scope of an impact statement prepared for a proposed
federal project should ask if the environmental effects of the project are
so interrelated with the effects of later actions that the impact of the
challenged project can only be adequately measured in a broader pro-
gram statement. If such an interrelationship exists, the court should
next determine the ripeness of the program for evaluation. Finally,
it should judge the appropriateness of halting the challenged project
pending completion of the program impact statement. By making
explicit the concerns which have guided judicial determination of envi-
ronmental challenges in the past, application of the interrelationship of
impacts approach will elicit more relevant evidence from the parties to
such cases and provide more adequate decisional criteria, thus further-
ing the purposes of NEPA by discouraging decisionmaking in "small
but steady increments which perpetuate rather than avoid the recognized
mistakes of previous decades."'140
abeyance any further action on the enjoined segment from Danbury south to Norwalk.
An attempt by environmental groups to prevent construction of the planned segment by
extending the injunction granted in Committee to Stop Route 7 was denied by the court
on two grounds: there was insufficient use of federal funds to federalize the project for
NEPA purposes; and the project had an independent justification. Citizens for Balanced
Environment and Transp. v. Volpe, 376 F. Supp. 806, 810, 813 (D. Conn.), aff'd, 503
F.2d 601 (2d Cir. 1974), cert. denied, 96 S. Ct. 135 (1975). The court recognized that
the original decision in Committee to Stop Route 7 had not resolved the appropriate
length for impact statement consideration, whether from Norwalk to Danbury, or all the
way from Norwalk to New Milford (which would include the segment to be constructed
exclusively with state funds). Despite the fact that construction of the challenged state-
funded segment might subvert the environmental study mandated by the earlier case, the
court refused to grant the injunction. 376 F. Supp. at 809 n.l. The decision was af-
firmed on the funding ground in a brief opinion by the Second Circuit. 503 F.2d 601
(2d Cir. 1974). In a cogent dissent, Judge Winter pointed out that the lower court deci-
sion was inconsistent with the decision of the District Court of Vermont in Conservation
Society I, ordering an impact statement upon the entire length of Route 7, and suggested
that the Second Circuit delay decision of the case until it had ruled on Conservation So-
ciety 1. Id. at 602. When the Second Circuit later affirmed the lower court decision in
Conservation Society I, it was careful to distinguish Citizens for Balanced Environment
as turning solely on the lack of federal funding. 508 F.2d at 936 n.43a.
The net result was that under the state-federal funding distinction, the Second
Circuit in the same year affirmed a decision allowing construction of a segment of Route
7 (which had arguably been enjoined in earlier litigation over a federally funded segment
of the same highway) and also affirmed a lower court decision finding a state-federal
partnership in completing Route 7 through a three-state 280 mile corridor and ordering
preparation of an impact statement over the entire 280 mile length of highway. It would
seem preferable to inquire into the effects of allowing completion of state funded
segments upon later segments funded federally, and to ask if the projects are not so
interrelated as to federalize the entire program.
140. S. REP. No. 296, 91st Cong., lst Sess. 5 (1969).

